632
622 land. When a person is asked where he is from, he will often give the local name for his "and debber agar" of origin.

634 The chega shum, village headmen, are supervised by the district chief, "worada shum", who is also appointed by the

● 625 governor. The district chief in turn appoints his own police, called "nach lebash" (lit. "thiefcathers in white"), who wear no special uniforms, merely the usual white togas, and carry rifles, in the use of which they are expert. They are used not only against petty thieves but against more dangerous bandits also. Their efficiency is commonly regarded as far superior to that of the uniformed urban police. Usually there is one nach lebash per half-district ("meketl worada") or two per district, unless an increase in banditry ("shifta") requires more.

651 Taxes, paid often in produce but increasingly in cash, are collected from each chega shum, but not by the district chief himself. For this task the governor has appointed a lieutenant, "mislane", per district ("worada"), who ranks equal with the worada shum and expects aid from the latter. Usually the mislane is a stranger to the district and himself a sort of glorified retainer and account-keeper from the court of the governor of the sub-province ("awraja") who has appointed him; while the district chief is a local man who may conspire with his village headmen to keep local prosperity from the knowledge of the governor's central office. The latter therefore has to rely on the cleverness of his lieutenants, the "mislane".

622
651 The administrative pyramid rests squarely on the shoulders of the chega shum. He collects local dues for

579 in-white", to control this. Sometimes these resort to the old-fashioned and officially illegal "afarsata" collective arrest of a series of suspected hamlets.

694 701 Another old pattern that survives is the personal bodyguard of the supreme ruler, i.e. the emperor, which has now increased to a size equal in manpower to the Ethiopian army itself, and is reputed to be far better trained and equipped. Centered at the capital and a few strategic spots, with greater mobility than the army, and battle experience gained in Korea, it contains much of the Galla "balbat" element directly loyal to the present royal family. The regular army is scattered throughout the country, and is utilized against periodic uprisings in the border lowlands and escarpments, such as the desert Danakil, the Issa and the Raya Galla of the eastern escarpment who occasionnally go on the warpath after the harvest season.

554 625 701 The attitude of the common people who admire an individual hero but mock uniformed dandies, still persists, much to the annoyance of the uniformed police of the provincial towns, and of the soldiers. The non-uniformed "näch lëbash" are far more respected, and their bravery is acknowledged.

632 Contact with feudal land tenure was maintained
566 by requiring the "gultenna" of the district to come to town every three months for a one-month statute labor, then called "wär tära", for the feudal lords now residing in town, if no war was in progress. Of course the actual labor was done largely by the "gabbar", but the gultenna was responsible. The domain of the feudal lord was called "gezat" (lit. acquisition, possession), and while this statute labor has now been abrogated, the term survives to mean "province".

632 The feudal chief of the province, imitating the
692 king, would "sit in judgment" in Solomonic grandeur, usually twice a week, under a broad, shade-giving sycamore, in front of his "palace". The latter could range rrom a spacious tent to a stone house of round design in the ancient style (or a Portuguese-type castle of the 17th century). Surrounded by courtiers and would-be courtiers, eager to proclaim the boundless wisdom of the lord, he would also appoint smaller judges, "danya", to hear more toutine cases brought in from the countryside by the cheqa shum officials. The town thus became a place where even thesimplest peasant could, at least theoretically, seek relief from excessive opression.

625 The bodyguard of the lord of the town, commanded by a "shalaqa" (lit. chief over 1000 men), could detail his men for duty as "zebanya" watchmen, of specific spots, especially near the market, and this force thus formed a kind of city police.

000 Since the town attracted the most clever "däbtära",

1: Messing E-5 (1953-1954)1957 MP5 Amhara MP5

632 little changed. Modern developments are merely superimposed on this pattern, mostly due to recent decrees
[178]
633 of the central government at Addis Ababa. This city had itself grown out of a modest village on top of Entoto mountain in the 1880's, when Menelik II transferred it to the hilly floodplain just below because the population flocking to his court soon after his early military victories had caused a severe fuel and water shortage on the hilltop. The fondness of the empress for the hot volcanic springs at the somewhat lower water table were another reason for the transfer.

The old title of "kantiba", mayor, was given only to those of most important urban centers, notably Addis Ababa and Gondar, and this traditinn has also been maintained. Although the mayors are now supervised by a young, modern-educated "Director of Municipalities" located in the Ministry of Interior in Addis Ababa, who may visit them or call them in for conferences and instructions, the appointment to "kantiba" is still made directly by the emperor.

[625] The urban chief of police is still called "ahalä-qa after the former title of the chief of bodyguard, and his subordinate officers are called "shambäl", the title used by Emperor Menelik II for the chief of his most select bodyguard("zebaña") of 300 men.

The kantiba can convene a traditional council of elders, called "chilot" (now often referred to as "commissions", after the Italian occupation), which includes the chief of police and top judges, to hear and discuss

1: Messing E-5 (1953-1954)1957 MP5 Amhara MP5

D. Traditional Methods of Investigation of Crimes.

694 [789] Two factors are noteworthy in the traditional method of investigating crimes. One is the use of the supernatural in tracing the criminal's trail; the other is participation of the Coptic church, once the suspect is caught. While recent, modern instructions from the central government try to suppress the former, neither factor has lost much of its power over the attitudes and beliefs of nearly all rural Amhara, even townspeople.

625 691 a) The thiefcatcher, "lēbashay", recently outlawed officially, was a hereditary office, passed from father to son, thus entrusted only to Amhara (or other Abyssinian Branches). This inheritance, however, much like inheritance of feudal fief ("gult"), had to be re-acknowledged in every generation. The heir, grown to maturity, would take his father's medicine bag, "korojo", travel to the head "lebashay" at the capital (of the province or country), and request renewal of license. This license could be withdrawn at any time, on complaints from the local headman, the cheqa shum, that the thiefcatcher had become corrupt, e.g. that he was in league with thieves and was so unsuccessful that he must be using fake medicine.

789 694 The magic involved in the procedure was "sympathetic magic", for the effort made was one of acting out all of the movements of the thief, from re-enactment of the crime itself, on the spot where it was committed, tracing his trail of flight, eating where he ate, and even resting in a state of sleep to indicate when and

694 (b) Collective arrest, "afärsata" was officially
672 discontinued only furing the past decade, and may well be re-established in any local emergency. It is usually applied only in cases of murder. The district administrator or governor could order the judges to arrest an area, then fence in all the men, and decree that "not a cow be milked nor a baby suckled", in the traditional phrase, until the investigation is completed. Every person was interrogated individually, and made to swear, before priests brought from the Coptic church, the oath of excommunication, "aggäzazät": "May He (i.e. God), perforate me as the Cross" ("ende mäsqälu yebäsasañ"), if thefull truth be withheld.

When the culprit finally confessed, due to the tremendous social pressure on him, he was chained and sometimes thrown into a dungeon until trial. The cheqa shum was made responsible for guarding him, and could be assessed heavy damages, even full blood-money, if the murderer escaped. If the murderer was not found, the entire hamlet or territory under collective arrest could be sentenced to pay the "blood-money", unless they could prove that the murderer must have been a "passing bandit". Even then the cheqa shum might be fined for not having been watchful enough. At present he is somewhat relieved from this duty by the local officer, a semi-feudal "fara-sanna", whose only job is to look out for bandits and prevent anyone from shooting off his rifle, lest a bloody feud break out and everyone become trigger-happy. This
625 is in rural areas. In towns, the police, uniformed in

625 khaki shorts and with shoes, are now made responsible for guarding the peace.

E. Litigation

691 The Amhara, especially the male, is trained not to suffer any injustice silently (unless temporarily powerless before a "great man"). No matter how lowly his socio-economic class status, he loves to engage in litigation. Observers have sometimes described it as a national pastime. Even children at play argue (fictional) cases, with enthusiasm, debating their cause before their own "judges", draping and undraping a rag from their shoulders, much like adults do their toga, in this activity.

693 A man is proud to be regarded as one who "speaks well in court". Therefore, he will be ashamed to let another speak for him, and the legal profession flourishes only in Addis Ababa before modern courts, in which modern laws are involved, using European (Greek, Armenian, etc.) lawyers. However, a woman or a timid man, or a timid ex-slave could hire a man who "speaks well in court".

This debate is followed in both civil and criminal cases, before the "danya" or "wombär", and every individual involved, including the gurarantor "(was"), cheqa shum, lebashay, etc., have an opportunity to argue as well as testify.

11:Levine Z-4,5 (1958-1961)1965 MP5 Amhara MP5

178 631 64 565 program not supervised by the Emperor, since any official's budding projects tend to be undone by his successor, whether because of personal vendetta, orders from the Emperor himself, or simply difference of approach. Thus has Haile Selassie been able to make sure that no one besides himself demonstrates any sort of leadership that might be attractive to the public.

At the same time his appointments have been made in such a way as to insure a balance of power—or impotence—favorable to his absolute control. By consistently appointing enemies to adjacent positions he has built in checks upon the behavior and sentiments of his higher officials. He has relied on mutual jealousies and conflicting ambitions to cause each to report anything incriminating he can find on the other. When appointees in the same branch of government have shown undue co-operation and friendliness, he has at times provoked friction between them.

In addition to the checks and balances of the *shum-shir* system, the Emperor has made use of an extensive intelligence system to keep watch over those in office and out. Not only the operations of the regular security departments [625] of the Ministry of Interior and the police, but also some of his closer advisers have had their own personal networks, financed by moneys diverted from various government departments.

178 565 656 472 Other measures have been used to check the independence of businessmen. Money has been arbitrarily taken from them by the imposition of fines, confiscation of property, and through requests for contributions for charitable causes. A few private entrepreneurs who have been too successful have been forced into government service. Licenses have been revoked, in some cases given to foreigners rather than to prosperous Ethiopians. Dividends from commercial enterprises have been withheld, or given to others whom the Emperor favored. (Rather than appear unduly wealthy, some Ethiopian investors have preferred to use Greeks, Armenians, and Arabs as the nominal heads of their enterprises.)

178 565 554 [177] [829] Due to their relative proximity to the Emperor, their patronage powers, their wealth, and in some cases their family background, the members of the new nobility command considerable deference, particularly in Addis Ababa. Their Westernized style of life (itself modeled to a great extent on the Emperor's habits) has set new standards for modernizing Ethiopia. At the same time they are the objects of much stereotyped hostility. The people in the country, and the commoners of the towns, regard them as oppressive and unsympathetic. Their logic often runs: "The big men around the court are no good; only the Emperor is for us." The intellectuals see them as reactionary, selfish, and corrupt. The massacre of some fifteen members of the new nobility as the final act of the abortive coup d'état in 1960 was an expression of this latter judgment.

178 565 643 662 The chief advantage of the new nobility—their relative enjoyment of im-

11:Levine Z-4,5 (1958-1961)1965 MP5 Amhara MP5

perial favor—has also been their great dilemma. Those who have been conscientious in seeking to carry out their proper responsibilities have been torn by the need to do what they regard as improper in order not to incur the disfavor of the sovereign. Those with narrowly opportunistic motives have been rendered no less uneasy by the need to counter the offensives of their enemies at court.

This dilemma and the related "immorality" is a natural consequence of Ethiopia's attempt to begin modernization under a traditional despotic authority. The behavior of the new nobility that is so bitterly attacked by the intellectuals will continue to reproduce itself until the process of modernization renders it obsolete—until the specialized standards which control economic and governmental activities have been firmly institutionalized, with controls that operate independent of expressions of loyalty to the sovereign.

Standards of competence have been more firmly institutionalized in the case of a special group among the new men of power—members of the military profession. The officers corps should in fact be considered as an elite group in its own right, in view of its distinct status and functions as well as the size and political importance of Ethiopia's security forces. The regular armed forces number nearly thirty thousand; there are also an estimated twenty thousand men in the police force and an unknown number in the recently reactivated territorial armies. The number of men with the rank of major or equivalent and above is thus probably close to a thousand.

Ethiopian military officers are recipients of the special esteem their countrymen have always felt toward men of war. They have also acquired prestige from the military's efforts to defend and liberate the country during the Italian period and more recently for their backstopping of Ethiopia's claims on the Somali border. They have at the same time been objects of an undercurrent of civilian hostility, based on the feeling that they are "parasites" and doing nothing positive to enrich the country. Their style of life lends itself readily to provoking the latter sort of objection. While dissatisfaction over income on the part of non-commissioned military personnel has been a major source of tension in Ethiopia during the past decade, the perquisites of higher officers compare quite favorably with those of their civilian counterparts. They have been given substantial salaries—and in addition, free housing, free cars, and servants and retainers drawn from the rank and file. Keeping in mind his particular need to insure the loyalty of the military elite, the Emperor has furthermore presented personal gifts to individual officers directly from time to time.

As a result of intimate contact with European and American personnel who have trained them in Ethiopia, experience abroad as trainees or in United Nations military missions, and the emphasis on rationalization inherent in the modern military profession, members of the military elite tend to be